Philosophers often use short, imaginary cases in their argumentation: thought experiments. The seminar examines this philosophical method through three central questions: What are thought experiments? What can we learn from them? And how can they be used for doing and teaching philosophy? To address these questions, we will study well-known thought experiments from epistemology and ethics, discuss competing accounts of how thought experiments work, and examine examples of how they can be used in teaching philosophy.

Requirements to pass active participation: assigned readings, presentation of thought experiments in class.

Selected Bibliography:

Gettier, E. L. (1963). Is justified true belief knowledge? Analysis, 23(6),121–123. https://doi.org/10.2307/3326922

Thomson, J. J. (1985). The trolley problem. The Yale Law Journal, 94(6),1395–1415. https://doi.org/10.2307/796133

Williamson, Timothy. 2005. “Armchair philosophy, metaphysical modality and counterfactual thinking.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback) 105 (1): 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0066-7373.2004.00100.x.

Norton, John D. 2004. “On Thought Experiments: Is There More to the Argument?” Philosophy of Science 71 (5): 1139–51. https://doi.org/10.1086/425238.

Brown, James Robert. 1991. “Thought Experiments: A Platonic Account.” Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy, 119–28. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

Sorensen, Roy A. 1992. Thought Experiments. New York: Oxford University Press.